The Transmutation of Defeat into Power
Or; how France went from destitution to the global leader in nuclear energy, Part I
Introduction
In the early 1900s France produced cutting-edge research on radiation and was home to some of the earliest glimpses of nuclear technology. Professor Henri Becquerel had identified that radiation issued from uranium, without an external factor, in 1896. Following his lead, Pierre and Marie Curie discovered additional elements that give off radiation, including polonium and radium, and coined the term “radioactivity.” Eventually their son-in-law, Jean Frédéric Joliot-Curie, proved that it was possible to create a radioactive chain reaction with uranium atoms, filing a patent for his discovery on May 4th, 1939.
Barely three months, later Hitler invaded Poland, and by May 1940, German tanks had crossed the border into France. The war destroyed the French scientific institutional apparatus and, out of fear that information would get back to the Nazis, the French scientific community was cut off from the efforts of the Manhattan Project. After the Allies won, France was devastated. As the country entered the second half of the 1900s, it was demoralized. Its statehood, let alone its technical prowess, was challenged. Nowhere was this more obvious than in their non-existent nuclear program. As Gabrielle Hecht puts it in The Radiance of France::
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki highlighted the enormous technological gulf between France and the United States. The consequences of the war for the French empire remained unclear, but prospects already looked grim in Indochina. The embarrassed, destitute nation resigned itself to accepting American economic aid in the slow and painful task of reconstruction. To use Robert Frank's phrase, France entered the second half of the twentieth century "haunted by its decline."
Yet by the 1960s, France had developed one of the most advanced nuclear programs in Europe with a fully operational, independent, military capability, and multiple working nuclear power stations for civilian use. They were even starting to export the technology to other nations. Today, they are the undisputed leaders in nuclear power generation. In fact, as a result of the country’s fleet of nuclear power plants, they have become the world's largest exporter of electricity. How did this happen?
There was no single policy or overriding quirk of French history that ensured such a triumphant outcome. Instead, it was the combination of a robust education system, privileged access to a novel tradition of knowledge, the emergence of a powerful state institution with pro-nuclear incentives, and a new set of political approaches. Alongside these factors was also the creation of a national identity that led to a set of non-standard decisions when face-to-face with a unique political opportunity.
No country’s approach to developing a capable nuclear industry, or any other industrial outcome, could be modeled entirely on France’s success. But, there are many lessons that can be learned from their story.
The Story of French Nuclear Development
We are in the epoch of technology. A state does not count if it does not bring something to the world that contributes to the technological progress of the world. - Charles de Gaulle
People
When Germany invaded France, many scientists fled to Britain and the US, bringing with them everything they knew about the nascent field of nuclear technology. However, because of the new Vichy regime, and a less-than-positive relationship with the leader of the French resistance, Charles de Gaulle, the allies were reluctant to share secrets in the other direction. This reluctance was eventually formalized as part of the Quebec Agreement, by which Britain and the U.S. agreed to work together on the Manhattan Project and excluded other foreign nationals from participation.
Canada was not formally included, despite the agreements having been signed in Quebec. Nonetheless, thanks to its close relationship with both countries and a well-developed university system, they ended up becoming a base for much of the shared research. This unique role also meant that when several French associated scientists who could work on the nuclear effort were denied positions in U.S, and British labs, they were (somewhat begrudgingly) allowed to go work with the Canadians at the Montreal Lab.
In the end, the research done in Montreal proved central to the efforts of the Manhattan Project. And, in September 1945, a month after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the lab produced the Zero Energy Experimental Pile (ZEEP)—the first operational nuclear reactor outside the U.S.
Later, many of the scientists from this project would return to France to form the foundation for the French nuclear program. In fact, one scientist in this group, Lew Kowarski, was put in charge of the efforts to create the first French reactor. He designed the reactor (Zoé) to mimic the designs used for ZEEP. And, by leveraging his knowledge from that project, his team was able to create a working reactor in 1947.
This kind of direct transmission of knowledge was essential to the creation of the nuclear industry everywhere. Soon after the war, Russia developed its own approach to nuclear power through a mix of espionage and independent efforts. Then, over the course of the Cold War, Russia and the U.S. allied bloc exported Nuclear Power technology to a host of countries as part of their respective attempts to build economic and political influence. However, by being the only foreign nation fortunate enough to have a set of scientists who had directly participated in the Manhattan project, France was able to get a significant head start.
Another significant factor that enabled France’s success in developing a nuclear industry was its educational system. France’s most competent scientists and technologists were all students of the Ecole Polytechnique, an elite university just outside Paris aimed at training the next generation of national engineers. The school had two unique aspects.
First, unlike most other country’s elite universities, the program was explicitly aimed at developing engineers that would work for the state. Graduated polytechniciens received significantly more opportunities to work on large-scale national projects and received very high status. Generally, students at less-well considered universities, who garnered the humble title of “civil engineer,” would go work in private industry.
The prestige associated with the school came in part from the high standards of training. But what was more important was a belief that the school cultivated an ideology of public service and leadership that was deemed morally and socially superior. Only the polytechniciens were considered fit to work for the glory of the nation. Such an ideological backing would later become essential to the development of the institutions that would scale up France’s nuclear power production.
Second, alongside technical courses and scientific endeavours, the Polytechnique emphasized an education in general management and leadership. Upon graduating, the polytechniciens were meant to be able, not only to innovate in scientific domains, but to effectively organize large-scale projects and interact with a wide variety of technical pursuits beyond their specialties. As Jean Bertholt put it during the interwar period:
The general aim of the Ecole Polytechnique is to educate leaders [chefs] for every branch of national activity that requires extensive scientific knowledge coupled with an extensive general culture [culture générale étendue]. By means of a strong moral, physical, and intellectual education, students are prepared to become leaders in the corps, services, and companies which need them.
As we have seen before with the Bauhaus, this generalist approach to training students can reap significant rewards, preparing them to engage all the resources at their disposal to achieve a particular aim.
Polytechniciens dominated the French nuclear industry from the very beginning, leading the country’s efforts to set up both civil and military applications of all kinds. In this process, both their ideological devotion to state building and their training in generalist leadership were put to good use.
This foundation of knowledge and elite corps of engineers dedicated to the state meant that, among the nations that were not part of the Manhattan Project, France took an early lead in developing a home-grown nuclear power industry. However their eventual ascendence was not assured. As we will see in Part 2, despite the high-minded utilitarian ideology of the polytechniciens, the industry was not without its own forms of competition and personal intrigue. These would present challenges for the French project, but eventually opportunities as well.
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Robert Bellafiore for reviewing an earlier version this essay and providing edits and comments.
This article could not have been written without Gabrielle Hecht’s book The Radiance of France. It is an incredible case study not only of how nuclear power developed in France between 1945 and the early 1970s but more importantly a powerful account of how ideology, politics, and technology are always interleaved in the deployment of any industrial concern.
Such an interesting post. Can't wait for Part 2!